We prove a general monotonicity result about Nash flows in directed networks, which generalizes earlier results and can be used for the design of truthful mechanisms in the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs when her edge is used.
a global authority but by many different selfish users, each of which tries to minimize her own latency or cost rather than the global performance of the network.
Especially in transportation networks, however, the behavior of the owners of the network edges (roads or railway lines) has not been taken into account so far. As more and more owners of roads (e.g., many European countries) impose tolls on the usage of roads in order to compensate for their costs, the impact of the selfish behavior of the owners on the network traffic becomes a major issue.
Motivated by this setting, our game-theoretic model of transportation networks considers two classes of selfish agents. The first class consists of the owners of the network edges, and the second class is given by the users of the network. When an edge of the network is used, its owner incurs costs, which are given as a general strictly increasing function of the load on the edge times the private value of the owner. To compensate for these costs, the owner of an edge imposes a toll on her edge, which every single user of the edge has to pay independently of the load on the edge. Each selfish user tries to choose a path through the network that minimizes the (weighted) sum of the latency she incurs and the overall toll she has to pay to the owners of the edges.
To model the interaction of these two classes of selfish agents, we use methods from selfish routing and algorithmic mechanism design. The selfish behavior of the network users is modeled by considering Nash flows. The owners of the network edges are motivated to set the tolls on the edges according to their true private values by using side payments that depend on the tolls and on the load on the edges.
In the second part of the paper, we consider an abstract mechanism design setting with two-parameter agents. This setting generalizes the well-known case of oneparameter agents by allowing nonlinear cost functions and a fixed cost component as part of each agent's private data. In our transportation model, such an additional, privately known cost component could represent a fixed cost for building and maintaining a road, which the owner incurs independently of the load assignment.
Previous Work
Mechanism design is a classical subfield of noncooperative game theory and microeconomics. An introduction to the subject can be found in Chap. 23 of Mas-Colell et al. [10] . The systematic study of algorithmic problems in the context of mechanism design was initiated by a seminal paper of Nisan and Ronen [14] . In algorithmic mechanism design, a mechanism is defined as a pair M = (A, P ) consisting of an (optimization) algorithm A and a payment scheme P defining the side payments to the agents participating in the mechanism. A mechanism is called truthful with dominant strategies (in the sequel simply truthful) or strategyproof if truthtelling is a dominant strategy for every agent, i.e., truthfully revealing her private information maximizes the profit of every agent for any possible behavior of the other agents.
Archer and Tardos [2] considered the important case of algorithmic mechanism design for one-parameter agents. In this setting, the type of each agent i is a single nonnegative real number t i . Each feasible solution x of the global optimization problem results in an amount of work w i (x) being assigned to agent i, who incurs a cost of t i · w i (x) for completing this amount of work. The profit of agent i is defined as the payment she receives from the mechanism minus her cost. Archer and Tardos [2] showed that an algorithm A for an optimization problem with one-parameter agents can be used in a truthful mechanism M = (A, P ) if and only if A is monotone, meaning that, for every agent, the amount of work assigned to her does not increase if her bid increases.
Selfish routing is another active research area these days. The book by Roughgarden [17] provides a comprehensive introduction to the subject. Much work on selfish routing in recent years has focused on quantifying the loss of efficiency due to selfishness. The most common game-theoretic approach is to consider Nash equilibria, i.e., solutions of noncooperative games in which no player has an incentive to unilaterally change her strategy. In nonatomic models of selfish routing as studied in this paper, the traffic routed by the selfish network users is modeled as a network flow and Nash equilibria are commonly referred to as Nash flows. Several authors have recently investigated how Nash flows are influenced by tolls on the network edges [5, 8, 16 ].
Our Contribution
We prove a general monotonicity result about Nash flows in directed networks, which states that the Nash flow on an edge cannot increase when the cost of the edge to the network users is increased. This result generalizes a result of Dafermos and Nagurney [7] , who studied an equivalent model of selfish routing. However, the analysis in [7] crucially relies on the so-called strong monotonicity condition for the cost functions of the network, which is a rather strong assumption and, in particular, requires all cost functions on the network edges to be strictly increasing. We do not use the strong monotonicity condition and our monotonicity result holds true in the more general setting of nondecreasing cost functions. Moreover, we show in Sect. 4 that our result extends to the more general setting of Nash equilibria in nonatomic congestion games without modification in the proof. A comparison of our results with the results obtained by Dafermos and Nagurney is given in Table 1 .
We use our monotonicity result for Nash flows and a generalization of the ArcherTardos characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents to nonlinear cost functions for the design of truthful mechanisms in the selfish routing setting with two classes of selfish agents described in the introduction. Our result about Nash flows implies that, when considering the toll defined by each owner of an edge as a bid for her private value, the assignment of load to the edges by a Nash flow yields a monotone algorithm. Hence, using a generalization of the Archer-Tardos characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents to nonlinear cost functions that we obtain as a special case of our results on two-parameter agents, this algorithm can be used in a truthful mechanism. Thus, our results connect the research areas of mechanism design and selfish routing, which are two of the main research topics in algorithmic game theory these days.
In the second part of the paper, we generalize the famous Archer-Tardos monotonicity result on one-parameter agents in two directions by studying a more general setting of two-parameter agents. The first generalization is that each agent has a second private value that specifies the agent's fixed cost. Thus, the private data of each agent is a pair of nonnegative real numbers, where the first component gives information about the load-dependent part of the agent's cost function and the second component is the agent's fixed cost. Concerning the fixed cost, we study two different settings. In the first setting, which we refer to as the case of nonadaptive fixed costs, each agent always incurs her fixed cost, even when she receives no work at all. In the second setting, which we refer to as the case of adaptive fixed costs, an agent only incurs her fixed cost when she receives a positive amount of work.
The second way in which we generalize the setting of one-parameter agents is that the load-dependent part of each agent's cost function does not have to be linear in the load assigned to the agent, but is given as the first component of the agent's private data times a general strictly increasing function of the agent's load. Important examples covered by this more general definition include situations in which the cost increases quadratically or logarithmically with the load.
For the case of nonadaptive fixed costs, we obtain a complete characterization of the set of output functions that can be turned into truthful mechanisms for twoparameter agents. Furthermore, this characterization implies that no truthful mechanism in the general two-parameter setting with nonadaptive fixed costs can satisfy voluntary participation (also known as participation constraints or individual rationality constraints), which means that no truthful mechanism for two-parameter agents can guarantee that agents who bid truthfully never incur a net loss. We show, however, that the Archer-Tardos characterization of output functions (or algorithms) admitting a truthful payment scheme satisfying voluntary participation extends to the setting of generalized one-parameter agents, which is the mechanism design setting we also use for the design of truthful mechanisms in the selfish routing part of the paper. It is the special case of our two-parameter setting in which there are no fixed costs to the agents but general load-dependent cost functions are allowed.
For the case of adaptive fixed costs, we also obtain a complete characterization of the set of output functions that can be turned into truthful mechanisms. We show, however, that the voluntary participation condition can be satisfied in this setting under a condition similar to the one given for one-parameter agents by Archer and Tardos.
A summary of our results for the different two-parameter settings is given in Table 2. 
The Monotonicity of Nash Flows
In the selfish routing part of the paper, we are given a directed network G = (V , E) with vertex set V , edge set E, and k source-destination pairs (
The users sending flow from source s i to destination t i are called the i-th commodity. P i denotes the set of (simple) s i -t i paths and is assumed to be nonempty for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We write P :
A flow is a function F : P → R ≥0 . For a fixed flow F , we refer to the value of F at p ∈ P by F p . Every flow F induces a nonnegative load f e := p∈P:e∈p F p ≥ 0 on every edge e ∈ E, and we call the vector f = (f e ) e∈E the load vector of F . Each commodity i has a finite and positive demand d i > 0, i.e., d i units of flow have to be sent from source s i to destination t i . Since all demands are finite, we may assume without loss of generality that
A load vector f is feasible if it is the load vector of some feasible flow F . The set of all feasible flows will be denoted by D and can be considered as a (compact) subset of R |P| .
Every edge e ∈ E is given a nonnegative cost function c e : [0, 1] f e → c e (f e ) ∈ R ≥0 , which specifies the cost for using edge e when the load on e is f e . We assume the cost functions c e to be continuous and nondecreasing and denote the vector of all cost functions by c = (c e ) e∈E . The cost of a path p ∈ P i to commodity i is the sum of the costs of the edges in the path, denoted by c p (f ) = e∈p c e (f e ). We write c(F ) = (c p (f )) p∈P to refer to the vector of all costs of paths p ∈ P under the flow F . Similarly, we denote the vector of costs of edges e ∈ E when the load vector is f by c(f ) = (c e (f e )) e∈E . We call the triple (G, d, c) an instance of the selfish routing problem. In what follows, we will always assume the network G and the demand vector d to be fixed, so an instance is defined only by the vector c of cost functions. Definition 1 A feasible flow F ∈ D with load vector f is at Nash equilibrium (or is a Nash flow) for costs c if, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, the following holds:
Flows satisfying the condition of Definition 1 are usually referred to as Wardrop equilibria in the literature, but Definition 1 can easily be seen to agree with the usual definition of Nash flows in our setting (cf. [16] ). To prove the main theorem of this section (Theorem 2), we need the following results: Proof By Proposition 1, f andf satisfy the variational inequality, so
for all feasible load vectors f . Choosing f =f in the first inequality and f = f in the second one and adding yields
Now we choose
Sincec e 0 (f e 0 ) < c e 0 (f e 0 ), it follows that > 0, and we obtain: 
Thus, it follows thatf e 0 ≥ f e 0 as claimed.
Note that we do not assume the cost functions to be strictly increasing in Theorem 2. The result holds for all continuous, nondecreasing cost functions even though the load vector of a Nash flow is not unique in this setting.
Also note that, in the case where all cost functions are strictly increasing, the assumptionc e 0 (f e 0 ) < c e 0 (f e 0 ) is not needed: Ifc e 0 (f e 0 ) = c e 0 (f e 0 ), thenc(f ) = c(f ) and it follows from the characterization given in Definition 1 that f is also the load vector of a Nash flow for costsc. Hence, the uniqueness implies thatf = f and, in particular,f e 0 = f e 0 , so we obtain the following corollary: 
Application in Mechanism Design
In our model of transportation networks with two classes of selfish agents, the costs of an edge to the network users are given as a weighted sum of latencies and tolls as follows: For every edge e ∈ E, we are given a nonnegative toll τ e defined by the owner of edge e and a nondecreasing, continuous latency function l e : [0, 1] → R ≥0 . The vector of all tolls is denoted by τ = (τ e ) e∈E . The cost function c e of edge e ∈ E is given by c e (x) := l e (x) + α · τ e , where α > 0 is a constant factor describing the sensitivity of the network users to tolls. The total latency on a path p ∈ P i is denoted by l p (f ) = e∈p l e (f e ), and the total toll on p is denoted by τ p = e∈p τ e . Using this model, Theorem 2 immediately yields:
Corollary 2 Let the costs be given as a (weighted) sum of latencies and tolls as above, where the latency functions are continuous and nondecreasing. Let τ,τ be toll vectors withτ e 0 < τ e 0 for a fixed edge e 0 ∈ E andτ e = τ e for all e = e 0 . If f,f are load vectors of Nash flows for tolls τ andτ , respectively, thenf e 0 ≥ f e 0 .
Note that the assumption that α > 0, i.e., that the network users have a nonzero sensitivity to tolls, is crucial here.
Our goal is to design a mechanism that ensures a certain amount of cooperation of both classes of selfish agents, e.g., to make sure that the owners of the edges do not exploit the network users by setting the tolls too high. A mechanism in this setting is a pair (A, P ) consisting of an algorithm A, which determines an assignment of load to the edges, and a payment scheme P , which specifies the payments to the edges by the mechanism.
The costs that the owner of an edge e incurs are of the form t e · γ e (f e ), where t e ≥ 0 is a nonnegative constant, γ e : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is a strictly increasing function such that γ e (0) = 0, and f e ≥ 0 is the load on edge e ∈ E. For example, if γ e is just the identity function on R ≥0 , then t e is exactly the cost that the owner of edge e incurs per unit load on her edge. The constant t e specifying the costs for the agent controlling edge e is only known to the agent herself. Since we assume that every agent only controls a single edge in the network, we will slightly abuse notation by identifying the agent controlling edge e ∈ E with the edge e itself.
The users traveling through the network are assumed to be infinitely small, so the effect of a single user's actions on the other users is negligible. Every selfish user of commodity i will choose a path p between her source vertex s i and destination vertex t i minimizing her cost given by l p (f ) + α · τ p . Thus, the traffic pattern arising will be a Nash flow with respect to the given latencies and the tolls defined by the edges. Note that the costs of an edge e for the network users are different from the costs that the edge incurs due to its usage: The costs that edge e incurs when the load on e is f e are given by t e · γ e (f e ), whereas the costs that each user of edge e incurs on e are given by l e (f e ) + α · τ e , i.e., by the weighted sum of the latency of e under the current load and the toll on e.
The mechanism considers the toll τ e defined by edge e as a claimed value (a bid) of edge e for t e . Based on these bids, the mechanism hands out a payment P e to every edge e. These payments are used to motivate the edges to set the tolls according to their true values t e , which define the costs the edges have to compensate for.
To see how we can use Corollary 2 for the design of a truthful mechanism, we first assume the latencies to be strictly increasing, so that the load vector of a Nash flow is uniquely determined by the latencies and tolls (cf. Theorem 1). Under this assumption, the situation fits into our framework of mechanism design for generalized one-parameter agents: The agents are the edges, and the private value of edge e ∈ E is the constant t e defining its cost function. The selfish behavior of the network users does not have to be considered anymore since it is taken into account by assuming the multicommodity flow arising from the given latency functions and the tolls defined by the edges to be a Nash flow. The result obtained in Corollary 2 states that the load on an edge of the network cannot increase when the toll on the edge is increased, so the algorithm described above, which just takes the Nash flow with the given latencies and the tolls defined by the edges as the assignment of load to the edges, is a monotone algorithm. Hence, as we show in Corollary 4 in Sect. 5, our mechanism will be truthful if and only if the total amount of money that an edge e ∈ E receives when the toll vector (bid vector) is τ is given as
where the h e are arbitrary functions, and f e (τ −e , τ e ) = f e (τ ) denotes the load on edge e in the Nash flow with the given latencies and the tolls τ .
In our situation, every edge e already gets τ e · f e (τ −e , τ e ) units of money from the users traveling on e via the tolls. Thus, the (additional) payment it has to receive from the mechanism in order to obtain a truthful mechanism has to be of the form P e (τ −e , τ e ) = h e (τ −e ) + τ e · (γ e (f e (τ −e , τ e )) − f e (τ −e , τ e )) − Note that Nash flows in the setting of Theorem 3 can be computed in polynomial time via convex programming [3, 16] .
Also note that the mechanism presented in Theorem 3 guarantees complete cooperation of both classes of selfish agents with the mechanism in the sense that no agent of either class has an incentive to change her strategy in order to manipulate the mechanism: No user of the network has an incentive to change her route since the flow generated in the mechanism is a Nash flow, and no edge has an incentive to misreport her cost (via changing her toll) since the mechanism is truthful. In the important special case where γ e is the identity function for every e ∈ E, truthfulness of a mechanism in our setting implies that the tolls payed by the users of the network are exactly equal to the per unit costs of the edges. Hence, a truthful mechanism ensures that the network users are not exploited by the edges via too high tolls as mentioned at the beginning of this section.
When all latency functions are linear, the results of Roughgarden and Tardos [18] imply that the total cost e∈E (l e (f e ) · f e + α · τ e · f e ) (i.e., the average cost experienced by the users of the network) in a Nash flow F with load vector f is at most 4 3 times that of an optimal flow, i.e., of a feasible flow with minimal total cost (such a flow exists since the set D of all feasible flows is compact and the function mapping a feasible flow to its total cost is continuous). Hence, the total cost of the flow induced by the mechanism presented in Theorem 3 is at most 4 3 times optimal in this case. A simple example in [18] , however, also shows that, without the assumption of linearity of the latencies, the total cost of a Nash flow cannot be bounded by any constant factor times the minimal total cost.
We now consider voluntary participation. As we show in Theorem 10 in Sect. 5, a monotone algorithm admits a truthful payment scheme satisfying voluntary participation if and only if, for every e and every fixed vector of bids of all agents except e, the integral of the work curve of agent e is finite, i.e., if ∞ 0 γ e (f e (τ −e , u))du < ∞ in our setting. It is easy to see that the functions h e can be chosen such that the mechanism in Theorem 3 has this property under one additional assumption. Namely, we have to assume that, for each commodity i, there exist (at least) two edge disjoint s i -t i paths in the network G. Otherwise, there would exist edges that all users of commodity i have to use and the load on each such edge e would be at least d i no matter what the bid of the edge is. Hence, using that γ e (x) > 0 for all x > 0 by the strong monotonicity of γ e , we would have In the case where the latencies are only assumed to be nondecreasing rather than strictly increasing, there can exist Nash flows for a given toll vector that induce different load vectors. This makes the problem of designing truthful mechanism that use Nash flows for the assignment of load to the edges more difficult.
When we assume that the mechanism can make the network users choose their paths according to a certain Nash flow chosen in advance, however, the problem becomes essentially the same as in the case of a unique Nash flow. For example, the mechanism can then choose the lexicographically smallest Nash flow (with respect to some fixed ordering of the edges) among all Nash flows for the given toll vector τ with minimal total cost and make the network users use the paths given by this Nash flow. Hence, under this assumption, we obtain a truthful mechanism similar to the one described in Theorem 3. This mechanism, however, does no longer have the nice and natural property that the users choose their paths completely by themselves as in the mechanism presented in Theorem 3.
When we do not assume that the mechanism can make the network users choose their paths according to a certain Nash flow chosen in advance, the mechanism has to deal with the uncertainty about the load assignment resulting from the selfish behavior of the network users. In order to motivate truthful bidding by the edges, the mechanism needs at least some information about which of the possible Nash flows will be obtained for a given toll vector since the Nash flow determines the loads assigned to the edges and, thus, the edges' costs.
In the rest of this section, we show how a randomized mechanism truthful in expectation can be obtained in this setting under the assumption that there is a commonly known probability distribution of the possible load vectors of Nash flows for every toll vector τ . In our setting, we define randomized mechanisms as follows:
Definition 2 A randomized mechanism is a pair M = (A, P ), where A is a randomized algorithm, which determines a (random) assignment of load to the edges, and P is a randomized payment scheme, i.e., the payment P e to each edge e ∈ E is a random variable. A randomized mechanism is called truthful in expectation if truthtelling maximizes the expected profit of every edge regardless of what the other edges bid and it satisfies voluntary participation if the expected profit of an edge bidding truthfully is always nonnegative.
Note that there is also a more restrictive definition of truthfulness for randomized mechanisms, which requires truthtelling to maximize each agent's profit, regardless of the outcome of the algorithm's random choices. Randomized mechanisms that are truthful with respect to this more restrictive definition are often referred to as universally truthful in the mechanism design literature [13, 14] .
Similar to the classic one-parameter case, our characterization of truthful mechanisms for generalized one-parameter agents given in Corollary 4 implies the following for randomized mechanisms defined as above: A randomized algorithm A can be used in a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation if and only if the expected load on each edge is a decreasing function of the edges bid/toll, for every fixed vector of bids/tolls of the other edges. The payments must then be random variables whose expectation is given by the same formula as in the deterministic case.
Given the probability distribution Pr τ of the possible load vectors of Nash flows for every nonnegative toll vector τ , we can design a randomized mechanism as follows: We let every edge e ∈ E set the toll τ e itself and let the network users choose their paths completely by themselves as in the mechanism presented in Theorem 3. Thus, when the toll vector defined by the edges is τ , every load vector of a Nash flow for tolls τ is obtained with the probability given by Pr τ . Hence, we obtain a randomized algorithm for assigning the load to the edges. We now denote the random variable that specifies the load on edge e ∈ E when the toll vector is τ by f e (τ ). Corollary 2 then implies that the expected value E(f e (τ )) of f e (τ ) is decreasing in the toll/bid of e, so the randomized algorithm can be used in a randomized mechanism that is truthful in expectation. The payments to the edges can be defined by the same formula as in the mechanism presented in Theorem 3 with f e replaced by E(f e ). Thus, we obtain the following result: This randomized mechanism ensures cooperation of both classes of selfish agents with the mechanism in the same sense as the mechanism described in Theorem 3 (assuming that each edge tries to maximize her expected profit).
Note that the mechanism does not use randomization to obtain truthfulness or a lower total cost. Randomization is only used to deal with the problem of uncertainty about the Nash flow and load assignment resulting from the selfish behavior of the network users in the situation where the mechanism cannot simply enforce a certain Nash flow, but is only given probability distributions over possible load vectors of Nash flows.
Also note that Theorem 5 holds for every possible choice of probability distributions over load vectors of Nash flows, but, to the best of our knowledge, there is so far no theory that answers the question which probability distributions are "realistic" for a given network and its cost structure. One way to deal with this problem in practice could be to use statistical data about the behavior of the selfish users in the network considered in order to obtain a suitable probability distribution. This, however, would require repeated interactions of the selfish users and it could be advantageous for the users to manipulate the system by choosing different paths (that would possibly not even form a Nash flow) during the learning process. Overall, the assumption of a commonly known probability distribution of the possible load vectors of Nash flows is quite restrictive and further investigation of its practical implications would be necessary.
When considering voluntary participation, the definition of voluntary participation for randomized mechanisms and the arguments preceding Theorem 4 immediately yield the following result: , u) ))du.
Extension to Nonatomic Congestion Games
In this section, we show that our monotonicity result on Nash flows can be extended to the more general setting of Nash equilibria in nonatomic congestion games.
Congestion games model situations in which several selfish users (or players) share a finite number of resources. Each user can choose among different subsets of the resources, and her cost (or profit) depends on the choices of all users. The selfish routing setting considered in Sect. 2 is a special case of a congestion game. Here, the resources are the network edges, and the sets of resources that a certain class of users may choose correspond to paths between the source-destination pair of the commodity representing this user class.
Congestion games represent an active research area these days. Atomic congestion games with a finite number of discrete players each of which controls one unit of unsplittable demand were introduced by Rosenthal [15] , who showed that every such game admits a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We study nonatomic congestion games, in which infinitely many players interact and each player has a negligible ability to affect the others. Nonatomic congestion games have recently been studied in [6, 11, 12, 19] . They are a subclass of the class of nonatomic games introduced by Schmeidler [21] .
We consider the model of nonatomic congestion games studied in [6, 19] , which is a nonatomic version of the congestion games defined by Rosenthal [15] . Our notations are chosen analogously to the selfish routing setting from Sect. 2.
We are given a finite set E of resources. Similar to the network edges in the selfish routing setting, each resource e ∈ E is given a nonnegative cost function c e : A strategy distribution is a function F : S → R ≥0 , and we denote the value of F at S ∈ S by F S . F S can be interpreted as the measure of the set of players selecting strategy S in the strategy distribution F . A strategy distribution F is feasible if
The congestion or load induced by a strategy distribution F on a resource e ∈ E is denoted by f e = k i=1 S∈S i r S,e · F S , and the vector f = (f e ) e∈E is called the congestion vector or load vector of F . The cost incurred by the players of class i selecting strategy S ∈ S i is defined as the sum of the costs they incur on the resources in S, denoted by c S (f ) = e∈S r S,e · c e (f e ). Similar to the selfish routing part, we denote the vector of costs of resources e ∈ E when the load vector is f by c(f ) = (c e (f e )) e∈E .
Nash equilibria in our model of nonatomic congestion games are defined similarly to Nash/Wardrop equilibria in the selfish routing setting (cf. Definition 1): Definition 3 A feasible strategy distribution F is a Nash equilibrium for costs c if the following holds for every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}:
The existence of Nash equilibria follows by straightforward generalizations of techniques used to prove the existence of Nash flows in the selfish routing setting.
The variational inequality characterization of Nash equilibria presented in Proposition 1 is well-known to hold in our setting of nonatomic congestion games (cf. for example [6] ):
Proposition 2 ([6]) A feasible strategy distribution F is a Nash equilibrium for costs c if and only if its load vector f satisfies the variational inequality:
Using Proposition 2, the proof of Theorem 2 immediately yields the analogous result for our model of nonatomic congestion games: Note that the model studied in this section does not only generalize our selfish routing model to the more general case of nonatomic congestion games, but also introduces different rates of consumption for the user classes. In traffic models, these rates could be used to model different amounts of congestion caused by different types of vehicles (e.g., trucks and passenger cars) on a road.
Theorem 7 Let c,c be two vectors of continuous, nondecreasing cost functions, and let f,f be load vectors of Nash equilibria for costs

Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Parameter Agents
In this section, we prove our results on truthful mechanisms for two-parameter agents, which also motivate our choice of cost functions in the selfish routing part of this paper.
We consider m agents indexed by the numbers 1, . . . , m. Every agent i has some private data, which is known neither to the mechanism nor to the other agents. Everything except the agents' private data is public knowledge. = o(a, b) , where the output function o takes values in a given allowable set O. Note that we do not assume the set O of possible outcomes to be finite as is needed for the characterization of truthful mechanisms/social choice functions by the weak monotonicity condition [4, 20] in more general settings. Each agent i incurs a cost denoted by cost i (a, b) = cost i (o(a, b) ), which depends on her private data and the outcome chosen by the mechanism. To compensate the agents for these costs, the mechanism makes a payment P i (a, b) to each agent i, which depends on the bids. The objective of every agent i is to maximize her profit given by
As mentioned earlier, we assume the cost functions of the agents to have a special form. Namely, each value o(a, b) of the outcome function o results in an amount w i (o(a, b)) =: w i (a, b) of load or work being assigned to each agent i. In our first two-parameter setting, the cost functions are given as cost i (a, b) = α i · γ i (w i (a, b) ) + β i , where γ i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is a strictly increasing function such that γ i (0) = 0. For example, if γ i is just the identity function on R ≥0 , the private value α i measures agent i's cost per unit load. Other functions γ i occurring in practice are γ i (x) = x 2 or γ i (x) = log(x + 1), which means that agent i's cost increases quadratically or logarithmically with the load assigned to her. In all cases, β i is the fixed cost that agent i incurs independently of the load assignment.
In our second two-parameter setting, the costs are given as cost i (a, b) = α i · γ i (w i (a, b) ) + g i (a, b) · β i , where, as before, γ i : R ≥0 → R ≥0 is a strictly increasing function such that γ i (0) = 0, and
Hence, in this setting, an agent only incurs her fixed cost when she receives a strictly positive amount of work. We refer to this setting as the adaptive fixed cost setting and to the setting in which agents always incur their fixed cost as the nonadaptive fixed cost setting.
As in the setting of one-parameter agents, our aim is to design truthful mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms for which truthtelling is a (weakly) dominant strategy for every agent, which means that profit i ((a −i , α and (a i , b i ) . In this setting, a mechanism is a pair M = (o, P ) consisting of an output function o and a vector P of payment functions. An output function o is said to admit a truthful payment scheme if there exists a vector P of payments such that the mechanism M = (o, P ) is truthful. Not to overburden notation, we often omit the dependence of w i , cost i , and profit i on some the components of the vectors a, b and/or α, β when these components are held fixed.
Nonadaptive Fixed Costs
We now prove our main result on two-parameter agents for the nonadaptive fixed cost setting. The proof extends arguments from the proof of the famous one-parameter monotonicity result in Archer [1] . It uses some results from convex analysis, proofs of which can be found in any standard textbook on the subject, e.g., Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal [9] .
Theorem 8 An output function o = o(a, b) in the two-parameter setting with nonadaptive fixed costs admits a truthful payment scheme if and only if the following holds for every i and every pair (a −i , b −i ) of vectors of bids of all agents except i:
For every fixed value of b i , the load w i (a, b) = w i (o(a, b)) assigned to agent i is nonincreasing in a i . 2. For almost all values of a i , w i (a, b) is a constant function of b i (where "for almost all" means "for all but a set of Lebesgue measure zero").
If these conditions hold, the truthful payments must be given as
which is independent of b i for almost all values of a i .
Proof "⇒": First assume that the output function o admits a truthful payment scheme, i.e., there exist payments P such that the mechanism M = (o, P ) is truthful. We fix an agent i and the other agents' bids (a −i , b −i ). Then we can consider P i and w i as functions of just agent i's bid (a i , b i ). We define a function p i : R 2 ≥0 → R by 
for all α i , β i , a i , b i ≥ 0. In particular, choosing b i and β i to be equal in ( * ) yields If we choose a i and α i to be equal in ( * ), we obtain 
In particular, for a i = 0, we get P i (0, b i ) = P i (0, 0) for all b i ≥ 0, so by ( * * ) the payments are given by the formula in the claim. Plugging in we obtain
On the other hand, we have already seen that
for all a i , b i . Since γ i (w i (a i , b i )) is nonincreasing in a i for every fixed value of b i , we also have
for all a i ,ã i ≥ 0, i.e., the function ϕ defined by ϕ(a i ) := a i 0 γ i (w i (x, b i )dx) (which is well-defined by Equality ( * * * )) is concave and γ i (w i (a i , b i ) ) is a supergradient of ϕ at a i for every b i ≥ 0. Similar to the convex case, this implies that ϕ is continuous, differentiable almost everywhere, and equal to the integral of its derivative. Moreover, we have ϕ (a i ) = γ i (w i (a i , b i ) ) for every b i ≥ 0 whenever ϕ is differentiable with respect to a i . Thus, for almost all a i , we can differentiate equation ( * * * ) and obtain
for all b i ≥ 0. Since γ i is strictly increasing, this implies that w i (a i , 0) = w i (a i , b i ) for almost all a i and all b i ≥ 0, which proves Condition 2 and completes the proof of the first direction.
"⇐": Now suppose that Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied for a given output function o. As before, we fix an agent i and the other agents' bids (a −i , b −i ) and consider P i and w i as functions of just agent i's bid (a i , b i ) . We claim that the formula in the claim defines a truthful payment scheme for o. To prove this, we have to show that Inequality ( * ) is satisfied for all α i , β i , a i , b i ≥ 0, which is equivalent to 1 and γ i is strictly  increasing, also γ i (w i (_, b i ) ) is nonincreasing for every b i . Moreover, the integral (w i (x, b i ) )dx is independent of b i by Condition 2, and we calculate
which completes the proof. a i , b i ) ) is continuous in a i for fixed b i , we see that the function ϕ in the proof is differentiable everywhere, so differentiating equation ( * * * ) yields that γ i (w i (a i , b i )) (and, thus, w i (a i , b i ) ) is independent of b i for every fixed value of a i . Hence, we obtain the following corollary: a i for every fixed a −i , b admits a truthful payment scheme if and only if w i (a, b) is independent of b i and nonincreasing in a i . In this case, the payments must be given as
When γ i (w i (
Corollary 3 Suppose that the function γ i is continuous for every i. Then an output function o(a, b) for which the load w i (a, b) assigned to each agent i is continuous in
which is also independent of b i .
As a particular consequence of Theorem 8, there does not exist a mechanism for two parameter agents in the setting with nonadaptive fixed costs that is strongly truthful, i.e., a mechanism in which truthtelling is the only dominant strategy for every agent: Whenever the true value α i of an agent i is such that w i (α i , b i ) (and, hence, Furthermore, Theorem 8 implies that the voluntary participation condition can never be satisfied in a truthful mechanism for two-parameter agents with nonadaptive fixed costs: In order to guarantee a nonnegative profit for every agent i bidding truthfully, we need (w i (α i , β i ) ) is independent of β i for almost every α i , so the profit of agent i is unbounded from below as β i → ∞ for every such α i . Thus, without any a priori upper bound for β i , it is impossible to guarantee a nonnegative profit for agent i when she bids truthfully. Hence, we obtain:
Theorem 9 The voluntary participation condition can never be satisfied in a truthful mechanism for two-parameter agents with nonadaptive fixed costs.
Note that the result from Theorem 9 does not stem from the fact that agents receiving no load when bidding truthfully still incur their fixed costs: As the above considerations show, it is even impossible to guarantee a nonnegative profit for an agent only in the case that she receives positive load when bidding truthfully.
An important special case of our two-parameter setting with nonadaptive fixed costs is the one-parameter setting we used for the design of truthful mechanisms in the selfish routing part of the paper: There are no fixed costs for the agents, each agent i only has a single private value α i ≥ 0, and the cost functions are given as cost i (a) = α i · γ i (w i (a)). As already mentioned, we will refer to mechanisms for this setting as mechanisms for generalized one-parameter agents. For generalized oneparameter agents, setting β i = b i = 0 for all i in the proof of Theorem 8 yields the following result, which generalizes the one-parameter monotonicity result of Archer and Tardos [2] :
Corollary 4 An output function o = o(a) in the setting of generalized one-parameter agents admits a truthful payment scheme if and only if the load w i (a) assigned to agent i is nonincreasing in a i for every i and every vector a −i of bids of all agents except i. In this case, the truthful payments must be given as
As in the classical one-parameter setting, output functions (or algorithms) satisfying the condition in Corollary 4 are called monotone.
When considering voluntary participation for the case of generalized oneparameter agents, we can apply the same argumentation as used by Archer and Tardos [2] to obtain the characterization of truthful mechanisms satisfying voluntary participation for the classical one-parameter setting: Fixing the bid vector a −i of all agents except i, the payment formula in Corollary 4 implies that the profit of agent i when she tells the truth is
Hence, since the value P i (0) = P i (a −i , 0) is independent of agent i's true type α i , we can only guarantee a nonnegative profit for i for every value of α i if the integral 
Adaptive Fixed Costs
We now consider the two-parameter setting with adaptive fixed costs. Our main result for this setting is the following theorem: 
Proof "⇒": Again assuming that the output function o admits a truthful payment scheme, fixing i, a −i , and b −i , and defining p i : R 2 ≥0 → R by
the same calculations as in the proof of Theorem 8 now yield that truthfulness of the mechanism is equivalent to
for all α i , β i , a i , b i ≥ 0. In particular, choosing b i and β i to be equal in ( * ) yields 
( 
Plugging this into ( * * ), we obtain
On the other hand, we have already seen that 
Since the left-hand side of this inequality is unbounded for β i → ∞ for every fixed α i , this implies that, for every α i ≥ 0, we must have w i (α i , β i ) = 0 for large enough β i , i.e.,b i (α i ) < ∞ for every α i ≥ 0, which proves Condition 3.
"⇐": Now suppose that Conditions 1-3 are satisfied for a given output function o. As before, we fix an agent i and the other agents' bids (a −i , b −i ) and consider P i , w i , and g i as functions of just agent i's bid (a i , b i ). To prove that the formula in the claim defines a truthful payment scheme for o, we have to show that Inequality ( * ) is satisfied for all α i , β i , a i , b i ≥ 0, which is equivalent to
To this end, we calculate
In order to show that this is nonnegative, we distinguish four cases:
In this case, the above terms evaluate to This completes the proof of the second direction.
We now show that, unlike in the case of nonadaptive fixed costs, the voluntary participation condition can actually be satisfied in truthful mechanisms for twoparameter agents in the adaptive fixed costs setting. By Theorem 11, the profit of agent i when her type is (α i , β i ) and she bids truthfully is given by , 0) )dx +b(0) = 2 as in Theorem 12 yields a nonnegative profit for the agent when she bids truthfully (in fact, even P (0, 0) = 1 would be enough here).
